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Investor protection through model case procedures – implementing 
collective goals and individual rights under the 2012 Amendment of 
the German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) 
 
 
Brigitte Haar 
Model case procedures have some fundamentals in common with collective redress in 
civil law countries. This is particularly true in the field of investor protection which is 
highly regulated and marked by resulting enforcement failures, which led the German 
legislator to the enactment of the KapMuG and its recent amendment which highlight 
exemplary elements of model case procedure. A survey of the ongoing activities of the 
European Union in the area of collective redress and of its repercussions on the 
member state level therefore forms a suitable basis for the following analysis of the 
2012 amendment of the KapMuG. It clearly brings into focus a shift from sector-specific 
regulation with an emphasis on the cross-border aspect of protecting consumers towards a 
“coherent approach” strengthening the enforcement of EU law. As a result, regulatory 
policy and collective redress are two sides of the same coin today. With respect to the 
KapMuG such a development brings about some tension between its aim to aggregate small 
individual claims as efficiently as possible and the dominant role of individual procedural 
rights in German civil procedure. This conflict can be illustrated by some specific rules of 
the KapMuG: its scope of application, the three-tier procedure of a model case procedure, 
the newly introduced notification of claims and the new opt-out settlement under the 
amended §§ 17-19. 
Keywords: collective litigation, investor protection, test cases, German Markets Model 
Case Act (KapMuG) 
 
I.  Introduction  
In the long run the enforceability of investor rights may go hand in hand with the 
attractiveness of the respective capital market. That is why collective redress for retail  
 
3 
investors is conceptualized as a question of market organization to be regulated by the 
legislator in light of the underlying market participants’ interests. This became 
particularly clear when thousands  of retail investors bought Telekom-shares at the 
beginning of the century on the basis of alleged misrepresentations in the prospectus
1 
and the Frankfurt trial court became inundated by 2100 individual lawsuits brought by 
15000 individual plaintiffs with the help of 700 attorneys involved.
2 In reaction to the 
resulting congestion of the court, the German legislator enacted the German Capital 
Markets Model Case Act (“KapMuG”), which has been serving as an experimental law 
with a sunset clause until 1.11.2010, just being prolonged after an interim evaluation for 
another eight years until 2020.
3 In the meantime, in the Telekom-case there have been 
two decisions on the basis of such model case procedures by the Higher Regional Court 
(Oberlandesgericht) in Frankfurt in favor of the defendants (file nos. 23 Kap 1/06 and 
23 Kap 2/06)
4, with an appeal pending before the Federal Supreme Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof). 
This legislative history already highlights the essential economic background of the 
statute, laying the foundation for  its specific regulatory significance.  Since in the 
Telekom-case the sheer number of claims could have threatened the enforcement of the 
underlying regulation  within  reasonable timeframe,  the  model  case procedure  as 
provided for by the German Capital Markets Model Case Act is supposed to be a means 
to aggregate, to a certain degree, small individual claims.
5 As such it aims to promote 
judicial efficiency and to reduce the risk of inconsistent adjudications in the same or 
very similar cases. This brings into focus the tension these model case procedures under 
1 For the allegation in detail see A. Tilp, ‚Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz: Stresstest für den 
Telekom-Prozess‘, Festschrift Krämer (2009) p. 331 at p. 334-337. 
2 For the legislative history confer T. Duve and C. Pfitzner, ‚Braucht der Kapitalmarkt ein neues Gesetz 
für Massenverfahren?‘ Betriebsberater [BB] (2005) p. 673; A. Keller and C. Kolling, ‚Das Gesetz zur 
Einführung von Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren – Ein Überblick‘, Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht [BKR] 
(2005) p. 399. 
3 For the original version see „Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz“ (German Capital Markets Model 
Case Act [“KapMuG”]) of 16.08.2005 BGBl. I S. 2437; for the recent enactment of the prolongation see 
BGBl. I 2012, p. 2182. 
4 BGH, court order of May 16, 2012, file no. 23 Kap 1/06, BeckRS 2012, 10607; BGH, court order of 
July 3, 2013, file no. 23 Kap 2/06, BeckRS 2013, 11428.  
5 T. Möllers and S. Seidenschwann, ‚Der erweiterte Anwendungsbereich des KapMuG – Neues und altes 
Recht unter Berücksichtigung von BGH‘,Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] (2012) p. 1268. 
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the KapMuG are subject to: the tension between individual investor protection and the 
regulatory goal of “regulation through litigation”
6. 
At the same time, this over-arching leitmotif of model case procedures may serve as the 
guideline for the following analysis of the question in how far the German KapMuG 
may serve as a suitable example of effective investor protection and its enforcement in 
light of specific parameters: A brief look at the conceptual framework of collective 
redress against the background of the  development in this field in the EU  and its 
Member States  (II.)  may help to put the device of model  case procedures  into 
perspective. On the level of substantive law (III.), the tension between individual and 
collective interests is reflected by the specific scope of application of the KapMuG 
(III.B.) and the procedural implementation of a three-tier procedure (III.C.). At the same 
time, the balancing of regulatory vs. individual interests leads to questions about the 
procedural position of the individual investor, as they become apparent from the new 
instrument of notification of claims (III.D.) and the investor’s right to opt out of a 
settlement (III.E.). 
II.  Conceptual Framework 
A.  Development of collective redress in Europe: Towards a “coherent approach” 
As becomes clear from the afore-mentioned goal of model case procedures under the 
German KapMuG, the latter possess  characteristics of consumer collective redress 
mechanisms. Looking at the EU regulatory concept, collective redress is part and parcel 
of a strategy towards an effective enforcement of the underlying regulatory goals, 
supplementing any public enforcement.
7  This may serve as an explanation why 
collective redress as a means to improve consumers’ material rights has gradually been 
introduced to a growing number of fields of regulation. Under the Directive on 
misleading advertising of 1984 Member States may empower persons or organizations 
with a “legitimate interest” to bring legal action.
8 The regulatory goal of  consumer 
protection becomes even more apparent in the case of the Directive on injunctions for 
6 See the corresponding title of the book edited by K. Viscusi, Regulation through Litigation (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies [2002]). 
7 B. Hess,‘ “Private law enforcement” und Kollektivklagen‘, JuristenZeitung [JZ] (2011) p. 66 at p. 70. 
8 Art. 4 (1) of the Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading 
advertising, of 10 September 1984, O.J. L250/17 of 19 September 1984. 
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the protection of consumers’ interests enacted in 2009
9 because any payment by the 
defendant for noncompliance with a court order will benefit public funds, thus resulting 
in a potential tool to implement regulatory policy. The Directive 2004/48/EC on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights is another  instance of such a  regulatory 
strategy  in the field of collective redress, aiming at an effective prevention of 
counterfeiting and product piracy and the effective enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.
10 In the field of antitrust the Commission published a White Paper on April 2, 
2008, treating among other measures to ensure effective antitrust enforcement the 
regulation of collective redress, without, however, forwarding concrete legislative 
proposals.
11  The following draft proposal  presented informally in 2009 met intense 
internal debate and fierce criticism raised by the member states, so that it was 
withdrawn.
12  Subsequently in October 2010, the EU commissioners for Consumer 
policy, Justice and Competition proposed in a more general “coherent approach” taken 
in a Joint information note “Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress: Next Steps” very clearly that collective redress has to be looked at “…as an 
instrument to strengthen the enforcement of EU law”
13, hence as an implementation tool 
for regulatory goals of the EU. 
This approach was adopted and further specified by the European Parliament in its 
resolution “Towards a coherent European approach to collective redress”, in which it 
proposes “… a horizontal framework including a common set of principles providing 
uniform access to justice via collective redress within the EU and specifically but not 
exclusively dealing with the infringement of consumers’ rights…” in 2012.
14 In addition 
to the regulatory significance of collective redress, the European Parliament also 
clarifies the method how to achieve it by providing in its resolution the “…need to take 
9 Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions 
for the protection of consumers‘ interests, O.J. L 110/30 of 1 May 2009. 
10 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights of 29 April 2004 , OJ L 195, 2.06.2004, p. 16. 
11 White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Brussels, 2.04.2008, COM (2008) 
165 final. 
12 For details of the draft proposal see F. Wagner-v. Papp, Der Richtlinien-Entwurf zu kartellrechtlichen 
Schadensersatzklagen, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht [EWS] (2009) p. 445. 
13 SEK (2010) 1192 (Oct. 5, 2010), p. 3, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2010/EN/2-2010-
1192-EN-1-0.Pdf (accessed on October 30, 2013). 
14 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Apprach to 
Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)), para 15, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0021+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
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due account of the legal traditions and legal orders of the individual Member 
States…”
15 
With a view to this resolution, the European Commission published another set of 
proposals on private group  litigation  in 2013, including among others a Draft 
Recommendation on promoting group claims
16, which, of course by its nature, is non-
binding and a proposal for a directive on private antitrust damage actions. It was jointly 
issued by the Justice, Consumer Affairs and Competition department of the 
Commission. The proposed binding directive on private antitrust damage actions must, 
to be sure, be considered and passed by the European Parliament and the Council yet.
17 
It includes rules on the use of evidence, the effect of decisions by national competition 
authorities, the applicability of joint and several liability, and the availability of a pass-
on defense. 
In contrast, in  the non-binding recommendation, the Commission takes a coherent 
approach envisaging the regulation of collective redress across different sectors, urging 
Member States to provide for relief for private plaintiffs for violations of competition, 
consumer protection, environmental and other laws on a collective basis under certain 
circumstances.
18  Its goal is not, however, harmonization as in the case of private 
antitrust damage actions. Instead, the Commission lays out some common, non-binding 
principles  that should serve as guidelines for the Member States’ conception of 
collective redress mechanisms, overall aiming at facilitating access to justice, stopping 
illegal practices and enabling victims of mass damages to obtain compensation.
19 
15 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Apprach to 
Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)), para 16, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0021+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
16 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
17 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member states and of the European Union, Luxembourg, 11.6.2013, COM (2013) 404 
final.  
18 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
19 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
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Among these principles one can distinguish between general principles common to 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress
20  and more specific ones relating to 
injunctive collective redress
21 or compensatory collective redress
22 respectively. 
B.  General principles common to collective redress in the Member States 
1.  Injunctive collective redress – representative actions 
The principles common to injunctive collective redress necessarily focus on standing to 
bring a representative action. The most common collective redress mechanism, group 
actions, as they are available in Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK (England 
and Wales), are brought by groups of victims or by an ombudsman, consumer 
organization or a leading plaintiff and the judgment following a collection action can be 
enforced by all members of the group separately.
23 In representative collective actions, 
which are available in Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania and the 
UK, the person, organization or authority acting on behalf of a group of individuals can 
enforce the judgment he/it obtains, but not all members of the group represented.
24 It is 
clear that this type of collective action will lend itself for injunction procedures, but not 
lead to financial damages to consumers, as is the case in Austria, Bulgaria, France, 
Germany, Greece, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. It stands to reason that in case of 
eventual damages obtained by the representative, but not enforceable by the individual 
victims, those are used for public policy purposes after being collected by the 
granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, I. para. 1, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
20 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, III., available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
21 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, IV., available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
22 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, V., available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
23 For this classification see European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview 
of existing collective redress schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 38; 
critical of classifications in light of the evolution of new types of collective actions and of combinations 
of the prototypes mentioned above cf. A. Stadler, Grenzüberschreitender kollektiver Rechtsschutz in 
Europa, JuristenZeitung [JZ] (2009) p. 121-122. 
24 I. Benöhr, ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution after The Lisbon Treaty: Collective Actions and Alternative 
Procedures’, 36 J. Cons. Policy (2013) p. 87 at p. 91. 
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representative consumer organization, without being distributed among the victims.
25 
Therefore, the Recommendation provides for clear-cut requirements to grant standing to 
bring a representative action. Standing is only granted to public authorities, officially 
designated representative entities and entities certified on an ad hoc basis by a national 
authority or court for a particular representative action.
26 From the public policy goals 
to be pursued it follows that the two latter entities should have a non-profit making 
character, their main objective should be directly related to the rights granted under 
Union law that are claimed to have been violated and  they should have sufficient 
capacity in terms of financial resources, human resources, and legal expertise.
27 
The necessary link between substantive law and regulatory infrastructure leads to a 
considerable importance and potential difficulty of the right choice of the entity granted 
standing to bring a representative action.
28 This may to some degree explain why group 
actions are the more common collective redress mechanism and available in Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK (England and Wales).
29 They are brought by groups of 
victims or by an ombudsman, consumer organization or a leading plaintiff and the 
judgment following a collection action can be enforced by all members of the group 
separately, so that the identity of the representative does not play a role as important as 
in the case of a representative collective action.
30 The Swedish legislator, for example, 
takes a broad approach not only with respect to the types of infringements covered by 
collective redress mechanisms, but also with regard to the forms of class actions which 
are permitted, ranging  from class actions to be initiated by private individuals to 
25 I. Benöhr, ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution after The Lisbon Treaty: Collective Actions and Alternative 
Procedures’, 36 J. Cons. Policy (2013) p. 87 at p. 91. 
26 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, III. paras. 4-7, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
27 European Commission, Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, C (2013) 3539/3, 11.6.2013, III. para. 4, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
28 D. Fairgrieve/G. Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates’, in D. Fairgrieve and E. 
Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) p. 15 at p. 
39; for the practical difficulties cf. A. Layton, ‘Collective Redress: Policy Objectives and Practical 
Problems’, in D. Fairgrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2012) p. 93, 97-98. 
29 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview of existing collective redress 
schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 38-40. 
30 For this classification see European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview of 
existing collective redress schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 38. 
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representative procedures in the field of consumer and environmental law that 
organizations such as consumer associations or a government-appointed authority are 
granted standing for.
31 Another example of a rather variable approach is the Portuguese 
system of collective redress. Law 83/1995 on the right to take part in administrative 
proceedings and the right of popular action offers the possibility of a so-called ‘popular 
action’ that can be initiated by a private individual, an association, or foundation on 
behalf of all the group members concerned, so that it has the effect of a representative 
litigation.
32 More variety has been, however, introduced by special legislation, such as 
provided for in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Securities Code, approved by Decree-Law 486/99 
of November 13, 1999. These provisions give standing to noninstitutional investors, to 
associations for the protection of investors and to foundations whose aim is the 
protection of investors in securities. 
2.  Compensatory collective redress 
a)  Collective interest action and joint representative action in France 
A much narrower approach is taken in French law where two procedural instruments of 
a representative nature are worth mentioning in this context, that is the collective 
interest action (action d’intéret collectif) and the joint representative action. The first 
one grants standing to certain consumer associations to bring claims in cases of an 
infringement of the so-called ‘collective consumer interest’ (Art. 421-1(1) of the Code 
de la consommation).
33 Considering that it is only available to accredited consumer 
associations and that the resulting damages will be awarded to these associations, the 
representative nature of this procedural mechanism becomes clear.
34 In contrast, the 
joint representative action can be initiated in the individual interest of consumers, but in 
light of the limitations on the way in which the mandate to act can be solicited its 
practicality is highly limited.
35  Against this background, the French government 
initiated a new Consumers Act providing for compensatory group actions (action de 
31 see R. Nordh, ‘Group Actions in Sweden: Reflections on the purpose of civil litigation, the need for 
reforms, and a forthcoming proposal’, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. (2001) p. 381 at p. 397-398. 
32 H. Sousa Antunes, ‘Portugal’ in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Sci. 2009, 
p. 161, at p. 162-166. 
33 D. Fairgrieve/G. Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates’, in D. Fairgrieve and E. 
Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) p. 15 at p. 
23; V. Magnier, ‘France’ in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Sci 2009, p. 114 
at p. 116. 
34 V. Magnier, ‘France’ in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Sci 2009, p. 114 at 
p. 116-117. 
35 For the prohibition of solicitation through a website cf. Cour de Cassation, Civ. 1ère, 26 May 2011, No. 
10-15676. 
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groupe) in Arts. 1 and 2 on May 2, 2013, which is still pending before Parliament.
36 
According to Art. 1 of the proposed act, these actions can only be brought in consumer 
and competition cases (Art. L 423-1). Only material, but no moral damages can be 
claimed by national consumer associations, who act on behalf of consumers and are the 
only entities with standing to initiate such  an action (Art. L. 423-1), so that the 
representative nature of this procedure is beyond question. 
b)  Collective action in England and Wales – Sectoral approach 
Things are not quite as clear with respect to England and Wales. Despite the research-
based support for the introduction of a generic opt-out collective action,
37 the Civil 
Justice Council of England and Wales forwarded rather detailed recommendations to 
the Lord Chancellor proposing a flexible form of collective action which could be 
brought on either an opt-in or opt-out basis according to the court’s decision in light of 
the circumstances of the individual case in July 2008.
38 Even so, Part 19.6 of the Civil 
Procedure Rules provides for a representative action granting standing for a claim for 
damages to an entity with no interest in the action itself, other than that of acting in a 
representative capacity.
39 Sectoral examples can be found in competition law (section 
47B Competition Act 1998) and, as far as the dimension of consumer law is concerned, 
the Consumers’ Association is the only such body that may bring such a representative 
action (Specified Body [Consumer Claims] Order 2005 SI 2005/2365).
40 
This was supposed to be fundamentally changed in 2009, when the Financial Services 
Bill introduced by HM Treasury adopted the reforms proposed in the CJC report, 
enlarging the range of potential claimants in the newly created class action to include 
pre-designated bodies, individual claimants and bodies authorized on an ad hoc basis by 
36 Projet de Loi relative à la consommation, no. 1015, déposé le 2 mai 2013, available at 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/projets/pl1357.asp, last visited on October 15, 2013. 
37 R. Mulheron, Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A Perspective of Need, Research 
Paper for submission to the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales, 2008. 
38 J. Sorabji et al. (eds.), Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions – Developing a More 
Efficient and Effective Procedure to Collective Actions: Final Report, Civil Justice Council of England 
and Wales, London, November 2008, Recommendation 3, p. 145, available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2FDocuments%2FCJC%2FPublications%2FCJC+papers%2FCJC+Im
proving+Access+to+Justice+through+Collective+Actions.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013. 
39 C. Hodges, ‘England and Wales’, in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Sci 
2009, p. 105 at p. 106-108. 
40 For more details about the development cf. J. Sorabji, ‘Collective Action Reform in England and 
Wales’, in D. Faigrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2012) p. 43 at p. 49-56. 
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the court.
41  In light of the upcoming general election, these provisions relating to 
collective actions were withdrawn from the Bill in April 2010. Instead, the consumer 
redress scheme as provided for in the Financial Services Act 2010 is a new possibility 
for the Financial Services Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority respectively, to 
intervene in cases of retail mis-selling and to award compensation to those investors it 
believes were affected. On the other hand, the legislator has been reluctant to introduce 
and facilitate actual collective damages claims in the narrow sense.
42 Only recently, the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS) has appointed a small panel 
of members to look at mis-selling, which has called for new legislation ensuring 
stronger collective redress powers.
43 
c)  Collective redress by sectors in Germany 
Germany also follows a sectoral approach in the field of collective redress, so that one 
has to differentiate among the mechanisms procedural law has to offer according to the 
specific law and redress that is sought.
44 The oldest and most common collective redress 
mechanism is the association or interest group complaint (Verbandsklage), whose rules 
were enacted in 1896 as part of the Act against Unfair Competition. Associations who 
aim to promote commercial interests (Verbände zur Förderung gewerblicher 
Interessen) have standing to bring a claim for injunction in the context of deceptive 
advertising. This type of representative action was extended to consumer associations in 
1965 and 1977 in certain respects: first the consumer associations were granted standing 
to seek injunctive relief under the Unfair Competition Act (§ 8 UWG), in 1977 the same 
applied to the Law on Standard Terms in contracts (AGBG). The Law on Standard 
Terms in contracts was repealed in 2002 though, but with respect to its substantive rules 
integrated in large part in the German Civil Code (§§ 305-310 BGB).
45 
41 Financial Services HC Bill (2009-10) [6] cls 18(5), 22(2)(b), (c), 24(2)(b), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmbills/006/2010006.pdf, last accessed on October 
30, 2013; for details cf. J. Sorabji, ‘Collective Action Reform in England and Wales’, in D. Faigrieve and 
E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012) p. 43 at 
p. 60-61. 
42 For the priority of regulatory collective mechanisms over procedural rules of court in England and 
Wales see C. Hodges, ‘England and Wales’, in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. 
Pol. Sci. 2009, 105, 106. 
43 Panel on mis-selling and cross-selling (10
th April 2013)(SJ015), Note 5, download at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtpcbs/writev/misselling/sj015.htm. 
44 For an overview see D. Baetge, ’Germany’, in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. 
Pol. Sci. 2009, 125-137. 
45 Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz [Act to modernize the law of obligations] of November 26, 2001, 
BGBl. I p. 3138. 
                                                            
  
 
12 
The rules on the right for consumer associations and commercial interest groups to seek 
injunctive relief have been included in the newly drafted and enacted Act on Injunctive 
Relief of 2002 (§ 1 UKlaG).
46 The latter goes beyond the regulation of injunctive relief 
against the use of unfair standard contract terms, making reference to violations of any 
provision protecting consumer interests in its § 2 UKlaG. Besides this rather general 
rule, there are specific provisions granting standing to certain qualified associations or 
interest groups in special sectoral laws, such as the Act against Restraints of 
Competition (§ 33 para. 2 GWB), the Telecommunications Act (§ 44 para. 2), the 
Disability Discrimination Act (§ 13 “Behindertengleichstellungsgesetz [BGG]), and the 
Federal Nature Conservation Act (§ 61 BNatSchG). In all these cases collective redress 
is limited to injunctive relief sought by consumer associations and qualified interest 
groups, making up for enforcement deficits and thus pursuing regulatory goals quite 
directly.
47 
At the same time, from the point of view of consumers another enforcement deficit is 
remaining because on the basis of such proceedings only injunctive relief, but no 
monetary compensation is available. It is true that the German legislator introduced 
claims for skimming off excess profits in the Unfair Competition Act (§ 10 UWG) and 
in the Act against Restraints of Competition (§ 34, 34a GWB), which an infringer can 
be held liable for by consumer associations. Any resulting revenues then, however, have 
to be handed over to the Federal Treasury, thus only leaving the risk of litigation to the 
associations.
48 Therefore this more recent amendment to the portfolio of procedural 
devices of collective litigation in Germany has not really changed the latter’s primary 
regulatory focus.
49 
d)  Collective actions and settlements under Dutch law 
46 Unterlassungsklagengesetz [Act on Injunctive Relief] of November 26, 2001, BGBl. I p. 3138 at p. 
3173. 
47 H.W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in Europe, especially in German civil 
procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p. 1473 at p. 1477. 
48 For incisive criticism cf. H.W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in Europe, especially 
in German civil procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p. 1473 at p. 1484. 
49 On the goal of the skimming-off claim to further consumer protection see F. Henning-Bodewig, ‘A new 
Act against Unfair Competition in Germany’, 36 Int’l Rev. of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
[IIC] (2005) p. 421 at p. 432; for its doctrinal classification between tort law providing pecuniary 
damages and unjust enrichment and its aim to deprive infringers of their unjustified gains for general 
preventive reasons cf. H.W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, Unrechtsgewinnabschöpfung, (Baden-Baden, 
Nomos 2003) p. 113. 
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In contrast, in the Netherlands the 2005 enacted Act on Collective Settlements Mass 
Damage Claims (Wet collectieve afhandeling massaschade [WCAM]), which is one of 
two distinct mechanisms of collective redress under Dutch law besides the 
representative collective action according to the general principles of the Dutch law of 
civil procedure under Articles 3:305a-c of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek; 
BW), introduced an innovative settlement procedure. Even though there have been 
some spectacular WCAM cases involving financial mass damages recently, such as the 
Dexia
50-, the Vie d’Or
51-, the Shell
52- and the Converium
53-case, there is no denying the 
fact that the number of representative group action cases is higher and increasing.
54 The 
latter’s scope of application is quite broad and has included the misleading prospectus 
by market introduction of World Online
55 and securities
56 cases.  
Even so, the prominence of the enumerated WCAM-cases indicates that these 
settlements may be gaining in popularity and for financial institutions collective actions 
may indeed act as an incentive to enter into a settlement.
57 In order for this line of 
reasoning to work, the settlement under WCAM provides for a procedural novelty, that 
is the opt-out approach. As a result, the settlements negotiated by investors associations 
have a binding effect on all investors similarly situated, except for those who declare to 
“opt-out”.
58  A 2012 amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure  may  also  boost 
collective settlements, admitting questions to be immediately submitted to the Supreme 
50 Amsterdam Court of Appeals, 25 Jan. 2007, LJN: AZ7033, NJ 2007 No. 427 (Dexia). 
51 Amsterdam Court of Appeals, 29 April 2009, LJN: BI2717, NJ 2009 No. 448 (Vie d’Or). 
52 Amsterdam Court of Appeals, 29 May 2009, LJN: BI5744, NJ 2009 No. 506 (Shell Petroleum N.V. and 
the Shell Transport and Trading Comp Ltd. Et al. v. Dexia Bank Nederland N.V. et al.); for details cf. I. 
Tzankova and H. v. Lith, ‘Class Actions and Class Settlements Going Global: the Netherlands’, in D. 
Fairgrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2012) p.67 at p. 77-78. 
53 Converium, Court of Appeal of Amsterdam of 17 January, 2012, LJN: BV1026, NJ 2012 No. 355; for 
details cf. I. Tzankova and H. v. Lith, ‘Class Actions and Class Settlements Going Global: the 
Netherlands’, in D. Fairgrieve and E. Lein, eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2012) p.67 at p.78-81. 
54 For the large number of collective redress cases in the financial sector and the Dexia- and the Shell-case 
in particular see I. Benöhr, ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution after The Lisbon Treaty: Collective Actions 
and Alternative Procedures’, J Consum. Policy 36 (2013) p. 87 at p. 92. 
55 HR, 27 November 2009, LJN: BH2162, Ondernemingsrecht 2010, p. 119 (World Online). 
56 HR, 5 June 2009, LJN: BH2822, NJ 2012 No. 182 (Effectenlease). 
57 For the interaction between the collective action the collective settlement cf. I. Tzankova and H. v. 
Lith, ‘Class Actions and Class Settlements Going Global: the Netherlands, in D. Fairgrieve and E. Lein, 
eds., Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012) p.67 at p. 74. 
58 From a procedural point of view H.W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in Europe, 
especially in German civil procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p.1473 at p. 1490-1492. 
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Court by courts, if directly relevant to the case.
59 It is true that this amendment applies 
not only to class settlements, but to any situation of a greater number of claims based on 
the same or similar factual or legal issues. In light of the fast clarification of questions 
of law to be expected from the Supreme Court, it may induce parties to settle and pave 
the way for an expansion of the settlement system. 
Apart from this enlarged potential range for settlements, the Dutch legislator has also 
widened their scope of potential application in an Act of June 26, 2013, amending the 
Dutch Collective Settlements Act, which extends the latter’s applicability to bankruptcy 
cases and the introduction of a pre-trial hearing.
60 The latter can be requested by either 
party to find out whether a settlement is viable. Thus incentives to settle are created 
early on. Since a party failing to discharge his obligation to appear may be charged with 
the costs of the parties that appear, on this occasion, the opt-out mechanism can produce 
additional effects. Therefore  overall, as a result of the Amendment the regulatory 
interest in a far-reaching settlement of a mass damage situation compels individual class 
members to opt out at an earlier stage of the litigation, if they disapprove of the 
settlement. 
3.  Model case procedures 
The opt-out approach of the Dutch Collective Settlements Act makes it considerably 
easier for the parties to reach a binding settlement, thus moving forward the litigation 
effectively. Quite similarly, achieving judicial efficiency in mass damage cases with a 
great number of claims on the basis of a judgment given effect over and above the 
parties to the model case itself  is the issue of primary importance in model case 
procedures as established in Germany, Austria and Greece, Portugal and to a certain 
degree in England.
61 Therefore this form of collective redress seems to put the emphasis 
59 Wet prejudiciële vragen aan de Hoge Raad (Prejudicial Questions to Supreme Court), February 9, 
2012, Staatsblad 2012, 65, available at 
http://www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vixgkclhezh0/f=y.pdf, last accessed on October 
30, 2013. 
60 Wet tot wijziging van de Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade (Collective Settlements Act 
Amendment), June 26, 2013, Staatsblad 2013, 255, available at 
http://www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vjavdaqvvpzo/f=y.pdf, last accessed on October 
30, 2013. 
61 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview of existing collective 
redress schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 39; for the procedural 
function cf. H.-W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in Europe, especially in German civil 
procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p. 1473 at p. 1478. 
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on its procedural function to aggregate a multitude of equal or similar cases into one 
single proceeding just as is the case in the collective settlement under the WCAM.
62 
In contrast to the important role of consumer associations and interest groups in the 
above-mentioned fields of consumer-related mass litigation, in model case act 
procedures only individuals have standing. Under Portuguese law test claims are 
provided for in the rules of administrative procedure law and are brought to bear if 
twenty actions have been initiated with respect to the same legal relationship or if 
twenty actions can be decided on the basis of an application of the same norms to 
identical situations of fact.
63 Austrian law leaves room for a representative test case 
action such that the Consumer Information Association can represent a consumer who 
assigns claims to it and there is agreement between the parties that the result of the test 
case is also binding for the other claims.
64 More specifically, in litigation in the field of 
partial debenture a statute of 1874 authorizes the appointment of a curator representing 
investors in court, thus exemplifying an early model case procedure for investor 
protection purposes.
65
 In contrast, in Switzerland these procedures have originated from 
agreements between the defendant and the claimants that a test case brought by one of 
the claimants will be binding between the defendant and all claimants, without however 
producing res iudicata effect for anyone not formal party to the litigation.
66 Similarly to 
Austrian law, Art. 86 of the Swiss Act on Collective Investment 
(‘Kollektivanlagengesetz’ [KAG]) provides for the appointment of a representative of 
the investors for liability claims precluding single investors from any action and 
producing res iudicata effect for every investor.
67 
62 H.-W. Micklitz and A. Stadler, ‘Collective legal actions in Europe, especially in German civil 
procedure’, 17 EBLR (2006) p. 1473 at p. 1478. 
63 H. Sousa Antunes, ‘Portugal’ in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Sci. 2009, 
p. 161, at p. 162-163. 
64 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview of existing collective redress 
schemes in EU Member States, July 2011, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-17, p. 14; G. Kodek, ‘Austria’ in: The 
Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Sci. 2009, p. 86, at p.87; for the related problems 
cf. S. Kalss, ‘Civil Law Protection for Investors in Austria’, 13 EBOR (2012) p. 211, at p. 215-217. 
65 Reference is made to this early example in the explanatory memorandum to the KapMuG, see 
Begründung KapMuG-RegE, Bundestags-Drucks. 15/5091, p. 16. 
66 For the background in the 80s when a number of claims by farmers under the Nuclear Liability Act 
following the nuclear explosion in Chernobyl led to the first test-case contract between the Swiss federal 
government and the claimants see S. Baumgartner, ‘Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland’, 
27 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. (2007) p. 301 at p. 342. 
67 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz in der Schweiz – Bestandsaufnahme und 
Handlungsmöglichkeiten, Bericht des Bundesrates, Bern, July 3, 2013, available at 
https://www.bj.admin.ch//content/dam/data/pressemitteilung/2013/2013-07-03/ber-br-d.pdf, last accessed 
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Similar to the above-mentioned  model case procedures the English civil procedural 
rules enable courts to select and determine a small number of claims in order to manage 
mass litigation, when there are a lot of claims raising the same factual or legal issues. 
Similar to the German model case procedures the English civil procedural rules also 
enable courts to select and determine a small number of claims in order to manage mass 
litigation, when there are a lot of claims raising the same factual or legal issues. This 
has been the case in the bank charges litigation
68, when the Financial Ombudsman 
Service and the County courts were flooded by individual claims which came to a 
standstill when the Office of Fair Trading and the bank set up what virtually amounted 
to a test case.
69 Other examples include the extreme Railtrack-case of 2005 with almost 
48,000 former shareholders suing the Government for allegedly trying to withhold 
shareholder compensation upon the re-nationalisation of the business.
70 In particular, 
the group litigation order according to Part 19 III of the Civil Procedure Rules
71 offers 
possibilities of flexible case management thanks to the discretion granted to the judge. 
The latter’s guideline is just as in model case procedures procedural efficiency, i.e. a 
minimum of delays and  low and proportionate cost.
72  Not surprisingly, the group 
litigation order has to rely on a register and cannot do without a binding effect of the 
ensuing judgment for the registered parties. The discretion of the court goes so far as to 
select a claim from the register as a test claim (Rule 19.13 [b]). 
Looking at the German law of civil procedure and its principles more generally, it 
comes as no surprise that in Germany a very distinct model of model case procedure 
prevails in comparison with the legal systems just described. The important role of the 
principle of party control over the proceedings (Dispositionsmaxime) and the closely 
related principle of party control of facts and means of proof (Verhandlungsgrundsatz 
or  Beibringungsgrundsatz) illustrate the dominant role of the individual parties in 
on October 30, 2013; for the legal situation under the former Act on Investment Funds 
(‚Anlagefondsgesetz‘ [AFG]) see Begründung KapMuG-RegE, Bundestags-Drucks. 15/5091, p. 16. 
68 The Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc & Others [2009] UKSC 6. 
69 C. Hodges, Developments in Collective Redress in the European Union and United Kingdom (Working 
Paper 2010), available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/1010%20Class%20Actions%20UK%2
02010%20Report.pdf, last accessed on October 30, 2013, p. 6-7. 
70 Geoffrey Rutherford Weir & Ors v. (1) Secretary of State for Transport (2) Department for Transport 
[2005] EWHC 2192 (Ch). 
71 Rules of Civil Procedure, Part 19 III Group Litigation, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part19#III, last accessed on October 30, 
2013. 
72 see C. Hodges, ‘England and Wales’, in: The Globalization of Class Actions, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. 
Sci. 2009, p. 105 at p. 109. 
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German civil procedure and the resulting procedural problems to bundle the underlying 
claims that belong to different claimants. Accordingly, these are the issues that shape 
the current German legal debate in this field. 
III.  The German Capital Markets Model  Case Act (KapMuG) of 
2005 and its amendment of 2012 
A.  Capital markets model cases – practical experience and empirical findings 
It stands to reason that the significant role of individual procedural rights brings about 
distinct limits to collective litigation mechanisms. As a result, when it comes to retail 
investor protection, in the German two-tier legal framework for the provision of 
investment services hand in hand with its implementation via civil liability in courts 
goes its public enforcement by supervisory authorities.
73 On the EU-level the potential 
divergence between the enforcement of the MiFID and investor enforcement of good 
behavior by investment firms becomes evident, civil liability regimes and procedural 
mechanisms in this field falling within the legislative power of the Member States.
74 At 
the same time, this makes clear the significance of the liability as provided for by Art. 6 
of  the Prospectus Directive
75, serving as the legal basis for the Telekom  plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
Until September 2009 in 24 cases petitions for determination in a model procedure were 
filed, in 12 procedures model case procedures were initiated, but only two led to model 
case decisions, another two to final rulings.
76 Up to that point there had only been 
model case decisions in the DaimlerChrysler- and the LBB Fonds 13-cases, the first one 
73 See from the perspective of substantive law O. Cherednychenko, ‘The Regulation of Retail Investment 
Services in the EU: Towards the Improvement of Investor Rights?’ 33 J. Consum. Policy (2010) p. 403 at 
p. 416-418. 
74 O. Cherednychenko, ‘The Regulation of Retail Investment Services in the EU: Towards the 
Improvement of Investor Rights?’, 33 J. Consum. Policy (2010) p. 403 at p. 417; N. Moloney, ‘Effective 
Policy Design for the Retail Investment Services Market: Challenges and Choices’, in: G. Ferrarini and E. 
Wymeersch (eds.), Investor Protection in Europe: Corporate Law Making, The MiFID and Beyond Post 
FSAP (Oxford University Press 2006) p. 382 at p. 424-425. 
75 Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending 
Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or 
admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to 
information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, O.J. L 327, 
11.12.2010, p. 1-12. 
76 For an exhaustive empirical overview cf. A. Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. Feess, Evaluation des 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes; Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der 
Justiz, Abschlussbericht, Frankfurt am Main, 14. Oktober 2009, Frankfurt School of Finance & 
Management 2010, p. 50-55. 
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being decided against the claimants, the latter finding a few errors in the prospectus. 
The empirical  findings of the study by Halfmeier/Feess  of 2009 do  not, of course, 
consider  yet  the  decisions in the Telekom-case
77  mentioned above.  Looking at the 
number of cases reported as model cases, one also has to take into consideration that a 
lot of times petitions for determination in a model procedure are filed, but rejected and 
not reported on grounds of inadmissibility. 
B.  Scope of application 
This restriction touches on the scope of application of the German Capital Markets 
Model Case Act (KapMuG) of 2005. According to § 1 para. 1 sent. 1 of the KapMuG 
the main procedure  of a model  case must be concerned with a claim for damages 
because of inaccurate, misleading or omitted public capital market information. As a 
result, claims for damages based on alleged breaches of duties of an investment 
advisory contract cannot be brought in a model case procedure.
78 This limitation makes 
it  clear that model  case decisions do not primarily aim at awarding damages to 
investors, but rather at clarifying common questions of fact or law with binding effect 
for a large number of similar cases. In doing so, a model case decision will deal with 
closely connected questions, such as (a) the materiality of specific information, (b) its 
accurate and possibly misleading content, (c) the knowledge of the defendant about the 
deficiencies of this information.
79 Since these questions will typically be relevant for a 
variety of claims, jurisdiction to render a model case decision does not lie with trial 
courts, but with the higher-level regional appellate courts. 
This rather limited scope of application of the KapMuG makes evident one important 
aspect of this procedure – its two goals being directed towards the implementation of 
the Prospectus Directive and towards the enforcement of individual retail investor rights 
77 BGH, court order of May 16, 2012, file no. 23 Kap 1/06, BeckRS 2012, 10607; BGH, court order of 
July 3, 2013, file no. 23 Kap 2/06, BeckRS 2013, 11428. 
78 As stated in the explicit wording of the former § 1 para. 1 no. 1 of the KapMuG; see the case law of the 
German Federal Court of Justice BGH, NZG 2007 p. 350; BGH, BGHZ 177, 88; BGH, NJW 2009 p. 513; 
BGH, NJW 2009 p. 2539; BGH, NZG 2011 p. 151; BGH, NZG 2012 p. 1268. 
79 In more detail on the legal questions typically highly relevant for a test case see A. Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. 
Feess, Evaluation des Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes, Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des 
Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Abschlussbericht, Fankfurt School of Management, 2009, p. 43-48; for a 
very brief overview cf. F. Contratto, ‘Access to Justice for Investors in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’, 
SZW/RSDA (2009) p. 176 at p. 185-187. 
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being on an at least almost equal footing.
80 How this translates into the actual model 
case procedure as provided for by the KapMuG remains to be seen. It is true, though, 
that in § 1 para. 1 no. 2 of the recent amendment of the KapMuG of 2012 the scope of 
application of the model case procedure has been broadened to now also include claims 
for damages resulting from the use of inaccurate or misleading public capital market 
information as well as those flowing from the failure to adequately inform about the 
inaccurate or the misleading content of public capital market information.
81 
This broadening, however, comes at a price for potential claimants. At first glance, this 
amendment seems to finally subject the same facts of retail investor disputes  to a 
coherent and comprehensive set of procedural rules, thus possibly avoiding inconsistent 
decisions.
82 At the same time, the inclusion of these claims may lead to a stay of the 
proceedings in the individual lawsuit of a retail investor where the trial court finds of its 
own motion that the decision will depend on the declaratory judgment as desired in the 
model case procedure  (§ 8 of the German Model Case Act 2012). As a result, the 
individual claimant will find himself to be part of a mass litigation and subject to the 
delays this will entail. This sheds some light on the problems arising from the way an 
individual may be forced into a model case under the KapMuG leaving it by and large 
to the judgment of the courts whether to stay an individual lawsuit with a view to a 
pending model case.
83 Critics point out resulting unnecessary delays which may be in 
conflict with Art. 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
80 On the regulatory goal to be implemented by the KapMuG see the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
German Model Test Case Act BT-Drucks. 15/5091, p. 16; B. Hess, ‚“‘Private law enforcement” und 
Kollektivklagen‘, JuristenZeitung [JZ] (2011) p. 66 at p. 68. 
81 Explanatory Memorandum to the Amendment to the German Model Test Case Act of 2012 BT-Drucks. 
17/8799, p. 16; for more details see A. Halfmeier, ‘Zur Neufassung des KapMuG und zur 
Verjährungshemmung bei Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012), 2145. 
82 K. Rotter, ‚Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetzes v. 16.4.2012‘, p. 6, download at 
http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a06/anhoerungen/archiv/20_KapMug/04_Stellungnah
men/Stellungnahme_Rotter.pdf;  pointing out pros and cons D. Junck, Die Reform des Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetzes aus dem Blickwinkel der richterlichen Praxis v. 25.4.2012, p. 3-5, download at 
http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a06/anhoerungen/archiv/20_KapMug/04_Stellungnah
men/Stellungnahme_Junck.pdf. 
83 For the margin of discretion of the court in this question see in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
German Model Test Case Act BT-Drucks. 15/5091, p. 20. 
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Union.
84 This is why there is the proposition to replace this approach with an opt-in or 
opt-out mechanism as it is common in other jurisdictions.
85 
C.  The three-tier procedure of a model case procedure 
Even though a model case procedure is marked by its adversarial structure involving 
two parties, its main characteristics indicate some regulatory control over the progress 
of  the proceedings and a certain tension between these two different procedural 
principles.
86 The initiative to file a petition for a model case decision is left to the 
parties, it can be either the plaintiff or the defendant to file such a petition in a case 
pending before the trial court.
87 Once the sufficiency of the motion is approved, the 
latter is published in an electronic register (§ 2 of the German Capital Markets Model 
Case Act [KapMuG]). As a result, the underlying individual proceedings are stayed (§§ 
5, 6 para. 5 of the German Capital Markets Model Case Act 2012 [KapMuG]) for six 
months until the quorum of at least nine more parallel petitions for determination in a 
model case procedure is reached. Otherwise the original proceeding of the individual 
lawsuit continues. In case the quorum is reached, the trial court issues the order for 
reference to the higher regional court (“Oberlandesgericht”), defining once and for all 
the legal questions to be subjected to the model  case procedure. In view of the 
overriding importance of this ruling and its implications for the outcomes and success of 
the individual plaintiffs’ claims, the role of the trial court formulating this order for 
reference is of utmost importance, since this ruling is binding on the higher regional 
court according to § 6 para. 1 sent. 2 of the German Model Case Act 2012 (KapMuG).
88 
Under the former KapMuG the trial court also had jurisdiction to decide about 
plaintiffs’ petitions to extend the scope of the determination in  the  model  case 
procedure. This inefficient division of responsibilities between the trial court and the 
84 A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung des KapMuG und zur Verjährungshemmung bei 
Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012) p. 2145 at p. 2146. 
85 A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung des KapMuG und zur Verjährungshemmung bei 
Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012) p. 2145 at p. 2146. 
86 For a discussion of the KapMuG of 2005 against the background of basic principles of German civil 
procedure see B. Hess, ‚Der Regierungsentwurf für ein Kapitalanlegermusterfahrensgesetz – eine 
kritische Bestandsaufnahme‘, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen [WM] (2004) p. 2329-2331. 
87 For brief overviews over the course of procedure of a model case procedure cf. B. Hess, 
‘Musterverfahren im Kapitalmarktrecht’, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] (2005) p. 1713 at p. 1714-
1717; F. Contratto, ‘Access to Justice for Investors in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Test Cases as a 
Panacea?’ SZW/RSDA (2009) p. 176 at p. 186-187. 
88 For procedural delays resulting from the court’s freedom to formulate the ruling with binding effect on 
the higher court cf. M. Vollkommer, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] (2007) p. 3094 at p. 3098. 
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higher regional court after the announcement of the order for reference to the higher 
regional court has now been eliminated in § 15 of the German Model Case Act 2012 
(KapMuG) that provides for a transition of the control over the proceeding to the higher 
regional court.
89 Notwithstanding this improvement serious delays and inefficiencies 
still result from the plaintiffs’ right unlimited in time to submit a motion to extend the 
scope of the determination in the model case procedure, which seems to be one of the 
greatest obstacles to a rapid and reliable conduct of the model case procedure.
90 
Once the model case is before the higher regional court, the court selects of its own 
motion the lead plaintiff according to the criteria enumerated under § 9 para. 2 of the 
German Model Case Act 2012 (KapMuG).
91  The other plaintiffs are joined to the 
proceeding as third-party petitioners who can validly undertake procedural steps as long 
as they are not inconsistent with the lead plaintiff’s declarations and litigation acts (§ 14 
of the German Model Case Act 2012 [KapMuG]) and who are bound by the model case 
decision (§ 22 para. 1 of the German Model Case Act 2012 [KapMuG]).
92  
This model case decision then forms the basis for the award of individual damages in 
the individual cases before the trial courts (§ 22 of the German Model Case Act 2012 
[KapMuG]). It goes without saying that a lot of times individual retail investors will, at 
this stage, still be confronted with difficult especially factual issues to be resolved in 
order to state their damage claims successfully. Problems such as establishing 
individual reliance on misstatements  or causation of investment decisions by 
misstatements come to mind.
93 
89 For criticism against the former rule see for example A. Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. Feess, Evaluation des 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes, Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der 
Justiz, Abschlussbericht, Fankfurt School of Management, 2009, p. 57; for a positive evaluation of the 
new § 15 of the KapMuG 2012 see K. Rotter, ‚Der Referentenentwurf des BMJ zum KapMuG – Ein 
Schritt in die richtige Richtung!‘ Verbraucher und Recht [VuR] (2011) p. 443 at p. 447. 
90 See with references to court decisions B.W. Schmitz and J. Rudolf, ‚Entwicklungen der 
Rechtsprechung zum KapMuG‘, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] (2011) p. 1201 at p. 1206. 
91 For criticism against the court’s discretion to select a lead plaintiff confer T. Duve and C. Pfitzner, 
‘Braucht der Kapitalmarkt ein neues Gesetz für Massenverfahren? Der Entwurf eines Gesetzes über 
Musterverfahren in kapitalmarktrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (KapMuG) auf dem Prüfstand‘, Betriebsberater 
[BB] (2005) p. 674 at p. 678. 
92 For more details on the position of the joined third-party petitioners in the proceeding before the higher 
regional court under the KapMuG 2005, which does not substantially differ from KapMuG 2012 in this 
respect, confer B. Hess, ‘Der Regierungsentwurf für ein Kapitalanlegermusterverfahrensgesetz – eine 
kritische Bestandsaufnahme’, Wertpapiermitteilungen [WM] (2004) p. 2329 at p. 2330-2331. 
93 For the causation problem and the closely-related issue of a shifting of the burden of proof confer 
ComROAD I and II, BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2007 p. 345 and 346; 
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Looking at the model case procedure as a whole, there is no denying the fact that it 
struggles with the frictions that result from the partial collectivization of claims. The 
latter may come into conflict with some basic principles of German civil procedure 
forming the foundation for the adversarial system, in particular the principle of party 
disposition. According to the latter it is for the parties to delimit the subject-matter of 
the proceedings.
94 In light of the final definition and formulation of the legal issues to 
be subjected to the model case decision in the order for reference to the higher regional 
court issued by the trial court, it is clear that the parties’ control is largely restricted. 
This goes even further, considering the higher regional court’s selection of the lead 
plaintiff that is therefore also removed from party control. 
D.  Notification of claims and individual lawsuits 
In addition, the parties’ control over legal proceedings under this general principle also 
extends to the parties’ common agreement when to initiate the proceeding and when to 
end it. This raises the question how plaintiffs can join a model case procedure after its 
initiation.  The  model  case decision by the higher regional court is  binding for the 
individual lawsuits whose proceedings have been stayed and are continued afterwards. 
In order to fully participate in the model case procedure in such a way, a retail investor 
has, of course, to file an individual lawsuit to begin with. This is particularly true 
because the regular limitation periods for claims based on issuer liability because of 
incorrect ad-hoc notification are relatively short, that is one year only pursuant to § 37b, 
37c of the German Securities Trading Act.
95 
ComROAD III, BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht(NZG) 2007 p. 269; ComROAD IV, BGH, 
Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM) 2007 p. 1557; ComROAD V, BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2007 p. 711; ComROAD VI (2007), BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2008 p. 382 at p. 383; ComROAD VII, BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2008 p. 385; ComROAD VIII, BGH, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 
(NZG) 2008 p. 386; see also J. Hennrichs, ‚Haftungsrechtliche Aspekte des Rating‘, in: Festschr. 
Hadding, 2004, p. 875 at p. 891; T. Möllers, ‘Kausalität für den Differenzschaden und uferlose 
Haftungsausdehnung- Comroad I – VIII‘, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] (2008) p. 413; 
IKB, BGH, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 2012 at p. 318; for details on the IKB-decision cf. 
among others Bachmann, ‚Anmerkung‘,JuristenZeitung (JZ) (2012) p. 571; Klöhn, ‚Die Haftung wegen 
fehlerhafter Ad-hoc-Publizität gem. §§ 37b, 37c WpHG nach dem IKB-Urteil des BGH‘, Die 
Aktiengesellschaft [AG] (2012) p. 345 at p. 356. 
94 H.J. Musielak, Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung, 10th ed. 2013, Einleitung, Rn. 35. 
95 Pointing out the relatively short limitation periods in this field as a potential reason for a high number 
of individual subsequent claims A. Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. Fees, Evaluation des Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetzes, Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, 
Abschlussbericht, Fankfurt School of Management, 2009, p. 47-48. 
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If a plaintiff now wants to avoid the limitation of his claims and at the same time 
participate in the effect of the model case procedure, each and every plaintiff will have 
to file a conventional lawsuit. This would then add to the above-mentioned congestion 
of the courts.
96 On the other hand, such a litigation strategy may turn out to be irrational 
for the individual claimant because of high litigation costs.
97 The latter include a share 
of the costs of the overall model case procedure proportionate to the claim in relation to 
the total amount of claims (§ 24 para. 1 and 2 of the German Model Case Act of 2012 
[KapMuG]). This applies for example to costs arising from the collection of evidence 
and inquiries the claimant did not initiate or in any way control and he would therefore 
not have asked for in his individual lawsuit.
98 In any case, he is forced into the model 
case procedure for the reasons stated above in order to ensure to be able to ultimately 
enforce his individual claims. It stands to reason that one may question this practice to 
force an individual claimant into lawsuits. In fact, it reveals aspects of the model case 
procedure that show an instance where the law tries to take advantage of the individual 
claimants’ incentives and their purses to use them and their lawsuits as a tool to enforce 
the regulatory goals  of  ad-hoc disclosure. In light of high litigation costs this 
enforcement policy may prove ineffective.
99 
On the other hand, the question has been raised how to mitigate the incentive effect 
resulting from the threat of a limitation of individual claims to file an individual lawsuit 
thus contributing to a growing congestion of courts and to further delays of the 
proceedings. In the recent amendment of the KapMuG 2012 the legislator did not go so 
far as to introduce a true opt-in mechanism that would only require a claimant to simply 
declare his participation in the model case procedure with no need to file a lawsuit.
100 
96 Pointing out that in 2003 there were approximately another 17.000 investors trying to avoid the 
limitation of their claims by way of registering with the Public Legal Information and Arbitration Office 
[Öffentliche Rechtsauskunfts- und Vergleichsstelle] A. Tilp, ‘Das Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetz: Stresstest für den Telekom-Prozess’, in: Festschrift Krämer, 2009, p. 331 at p. 
333. 
97 Further details on the incentive effects of relatively high entry requirements and the non-existence of a 
nonformal participation A. Halfmeier/P. Rott/E. Fees, Evaluation des Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetzes, Forschungsvorhaben im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, 
Abschlussbericht, Fankfurt School of Management, 2009, p. 101-103. 
98 B.-W. Schmitz, in: M. Habersack/P. Mülbert/M. Schlitt (eds.), Handbuch der Kapitalmarktinformation, 
2008, § 32 Rdnr. 312; A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung des KapMuG und zur Verjährungshemmung bei 
Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012) p. 2145 at p. 2146-2147. 
99 For details on the litigation costs and criticism in this respect see K. Rotter, ‚Der Referentenentwurf des 
BMJ zum KapMuG – Ein Schritt in die richtige Richtung‘ Verbraucher und Recht [VuR] (2011) p. 443. 
100 Critical of this only half-hearted solution of notification A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung des KapMuG 
und zur Verjährungshemmung bei Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012) p. 2145 at p. 
2146-2147 and p. 2151. 
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Instead, § 10 para. 2-4 of the German Model Case Act of 2012 provides that a simple 
“notification” of claims will suspend their limitation. After the model case procedure 
the notifying person has three more months to file his lawsuit before limitation sets 
in.
101  To be sure, this procedural simplification for the individual claimant, by no 
means, amounts to an actual joinder of procedures because the notifier  does not 
participate in the model case procedure and the decision is not binding for him.
102 
E.  Opt-out settlement with court approval 
The only very limited participation of a notifier also shows itself in his non-inclusion in 
the newly introduced opt-out settlement under the recently amended §§ 17-19 of the 
German Model Case Act of 2012 (KapMuG). This new procedure, partly borrowed 
from the above mentioned 2005 Dutch Act on Collective Settlements Mass Damage 
Claims (Wet collectieve afhandeling massaschade [WCAM]), offers the opportunity to 
plaintiffs in a model case procedure to submit to the court a proposal for settlement.
103 
The latter has to be approved by the court by way of an order from which no appeal 
shall lie, if it considers the proposal reasonable in light of the previous presentation of 
the main features of the case and the results of the hearings conducted with the parties 
so far (§ 18 para. 1 of the German Model Case Act of 2012 [KapMuG]). 
This seemingly high degree of court control over the settlement might be taken as an 
indication for prevailing regulatory interests brought to bear in the rules on the opt-out 
settlement. At the same time, judging from the Explanatory Memorandum the legislator 
primarily aimed at ensuring practicality and non-discrimination
104, therefore § 18 para. 
1 of the German Model Case Act of 2012 can be taken as a provision to ensure a 
judicial assessment as to the basic fairness of the settlement proposal. This becomes 
apparent from the possibility to invalidate the settlement by an opt-out of at least 30% 
of the joined parties pursuant to § 17 para. 1 sent. 4 of the German Model Case Act of 
2012 [KapMuG]. In addition to this invalidation of the settlement proposal by at least 
101 For details on the limitation of claims under this new provision confer  A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung 
des KapMuG und zur Verjährungshemmung bei Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012) 
p. 2145 at p. 2147-2149. 
102 K. Rotter, ‚Der Referentenentwurf des BMJ zum KapMuG – Ein Schritt in die richtige Richtung‘, 
Verbraucher und Recht [VuR] (2011) p. 443. 
103 For parallels and differences with regard to the Dutch rule see A. Halfmeier, ‚Zur Neufassung des 
KapMuG und zur Verjährungshemmung bei Prospekthaftungsansprüchen‘, Der Betrieb [DB] (2012) p. 
2145 at p. 2150. 
104 Explanatory Memorandum to the Amendment to the German Model Test Case Act of 2012 BT-
Drucks. 17/8799, p. 24-25. 
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30% of the plaintiffs, the amendment of 2012 also offers the possibility to a joined party 
to opt-out on his or her own in case of discontent pursuant to § 19 para. 2 of the German 
Model Case Act of 2012 [KapMuG]. 
Comparing the legal effect of the settlement under the German Model Case Act of 2012 
with that under the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements Mass Damage Claims (Wet 
collectieve afhandeling massaschade [WCAM]), there are notable differences: Whereas 
the settlement in a German model case procedure is only binding on the parties to the 
proceedings, under the WCAM a settlement is binding on every affected person 
irrespective of a lawsuit that has been filed.
105  In addition, the Dutch provision 
enumerates a few reasons why a settlement may not be considered to be reasonable and 
therefore may not be approved by the court as opposed to the German approach that 
without more seems to assume in general the reasonableness of the proposal.
106 Overall, 
one might conclude from these instances that the German procedure leaves a little more 
room for individual investor interests vs. regulatory goals than is the case in the 
settlement pursuant to the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements Mass Damage Claims 
(Wet collectieve afhandeling massaschade [WCAM]). 
IV.  Summary 
The German Model Case Procedure  Act can be characterized by its main goals  to 
improve individual investor protection by facilitating the enforcement of individual 
claims, to facilitate the enforcement of capital market regulation, and to reduce the 
burden on the judicial system.
107 These goals could not all be fully achieved at once 
with the German Model Case Procedure Act of 2005, as has become apparent on the 
occasion of the first cases, namely the Telekom-case to be litigated in such a procedure. 
These goals are, however, the criteria to focus on, when it comes to evaluating the latest 
amendment of this act in 2012. 
They are also the cornerstones of the on-going debate on collective redress in Europe 
where the European Commission has lately proposed a coherent approach. The latter 
calls for the regulation of collective redress across different sectors and urges the 
105 A. Mom, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz in den Niederlanden (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2011) p. 363. 
106 For details on the Dutch provisions concerning the settlement confer A. Mom, Kollektiver 
Rechtsschutz in den Niederlanden (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2011) p. 353, 456-457. 
107 Explanatory Memorandum to the German Model Case Act BT-Drucks. 15/5091, p. 16. 
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Member States to provide for relief for private plaintiffs in these sectors such as 
competition law, consumer protection, and environmental law. The general principles 
common to injunctive and compensatory collective redress laid out by the Commission 
are not targeted towards harmonization and make clear the broad variety of collective 
redress mechanisms in the Member States. Apart from Germany, only a few of them 
provide for model case procedures, such as Austria, Portugal, Switzerland and to a 
certain degree England and Wales. In light of the considerable role of the individual 
claimant in this type of procedure, the importance of the German model is hardly 
surprising, given the dominant role of individual parties in German civil procedure. 
Therefore this is also the determinant of the German Model Case Procedure Act. 
By broadening the scope of application of the German Model Case Procedure Act in the 
Amendment of 2012, the legislator decided to include claims for damages resulting 
from the use of inaccurate or misleading public capital market information as well as 
those flowing from a failure to inform about such inaccurate or misleading content. 
Besides improving  investor protection, this enlarged scope of application may also 
subject an individual claimant to a mass litigation and the possibly resulting delays and 
limitations of his procedural rights. 
The German model case procedure is characterized by a three-tier procedure, starting 
from the petition for a model case decision in the trial court, leading to the resolution of 
the legal issues raised in the petition by the higher regional court and going back to the 
individual lawsuits before the trial courts. The sometimes procedurally time-consuming 
ping-pong match between the lower and the higher court produced long delays and 
proved to be very inefficient at times. That is why the amendment has tried to improve 
the conduct of the proceedings in order to accelerate the model case procedure and to 
enhance its  efficiency. Even so, these changes have not eased the overall friction 
between the procedural needs necessarily arising from the bundling of individual claims 
and the regulatory goals sometimes lurking behind them. 
The newly introduced notification of claims does not amount to a full-fledged opt-in 
mechanism, but only suspends the limitation of claims. Therefore the participation 
threshold is not effectively lowered and enforcement will not increase notably. As far as 
the new opt-out settlement under the amendment of the German Model Case Act of 
2012 is concerned, one has to note that both regulatory interests as well as individual  
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investor interests enter into it. This shows in the necessary court approval from which 
no appeal shall lie, but which can be invalidated by an opt-out of at least 30% of the 
joined parties, who can also opt-out on their own in order to avoid participation. 
The remaining shortcomings and compromises of the amendment led the Green Party to 
present a reform proposal in the German Bundestag that aimed to replace the German 
Model Case Procedure Act with a universal group procedure act applicable to all civil 
and commercial matters  in June 2013.
108  No ordinary filing of a  lawsuit would be 
necessary anymore and there would be opt-in possibilities in order to keep costs low 
and eliminate participation thresholds.
109 At the same time, opt-out mechanisms were 
rejected because of the potential binding effect of the later decision on disagreeing 
parties against their will, if they fail to opt-out explicitly.
110  Not surprisingly, the 
proposal  ultimately had  symbolic status  only  resulting from the  subsequent  general 
elections, which  did not provide the Greens with the necessary votes necessary in 
parliament to pave the way for success. Therefore the remaining questions about the 
KapMuG of 2012 still have to be resolved. 
 
 
 
108 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Einführung 
von Gruppenverfahren, BT-Drucks. 17/13756 v. 5.06.2013, Art. 1 of the draft, p. 4 and p. 12. 
109 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Einführung 
von Gruppenverfahren, BT-Drucks. 17/13756 v. 5.06.2013, p. 13-15. 
110 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Einführung 
von Gruppenverfahren, BT-Drucks. 17/13756 v. 5.06.2013, p. 15. 
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